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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SYNTHETIC FUELS
EDWARD E. NOBLE*
I am never sure how much people know about synthetic fuels, so I am
going to present a basic overview. The issue with synthetic fuels is the ability
to convert solid fossil energy, primarily coal and oil shale, mainly heavy oil
and tar sands, into liquids and gases. The United States has solid fossil
resources equivalent to five or six times the reserves of the entire Middle East,
and we can prove up these solid fossil resources with a modest program and
assure the country centuries of energy security.
We began with a program that was designed to spend $88 billion-$88 billion
was authorized and $20 billion actually appropriated in June 1980 under Presi-
dent Carter's administration when the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) was
established. We have taken this massive program and scaled it back to 2 to
3 percent of the original $88 billion. I spoke out strongly in 1980 about the
lack of need for such a massive program; we did not need it then and we
do not need it today. We do need to develop the technology and the infrastruc-
ture to use our massive solid fossil reserves efficiently and economically as
marketplace or national security needs warrant.
Let me give you a little history. The Synthetic Fuels Corporation was
established in June 1980. I came on a temporary basis in November 1980
to head the SFC transition team for the incoming Reagan administration.
The transition team recommended that the administration abolish the Syn-
thetic Fuels Corporation because of the enormous potential for abuse in its
unnecessarily large $88 billion program. We outlined valid national security
reasons for proceeding with just a few synthetic fuels plants on a commercial
scale.
The present administration decided to go ahead with the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, and asked me to head it. I agreed because I recognized the im-
portance of a commercial synthetic fuels capability to our national security.
This is the basic reason the administration signed off on the program. I feel,
however, that all we need are a few plants, about a half dozen, to show we
can do this.
Twenty billion dollars had been appropriated to the Synthetic Fuels Cor-
poration. Congress apparently did not think the corporation could spend the
money fast enough, so it put $5 billion of the $20 billion in the Department
of Energy (DOE), -into what it designated the "fast track" synfuels programs.
DOE had three projects almost negotiated when I became chairman of the
corporation in May 1981. At that time I told Secretary of Energy Jim Ed-
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wards that I was strongly opposed to two of the three projects. One had in-
sufficient design to estimate its costs accurately, and the other was forecasting
success on the basis of projected oil and gas prices ten years in the future.
DOE nevertheless awarded contracts to all three projects. The two problematic
projects indeed had the very problems I predicted.
In 1981 the corporation had more than $15 billion, and we faced a real
clamor to sign plants quickly. None of the plants proposed in 1981, however,
was mature enough in design, management, or equity to merit federal support.
The corporation had to move slowly, set criteria, and give the projects time
to mature. Only then would we provide assistance to a few commercial plants
(five or six) to show the rest of the world that the United States can use its
massive solid fossil resources at a reasonable cost to meet its own energy needs.
Even if we never needed synthetic fuels, these plants would provide stability
in energy prices along with the security of knowing that, should another supply
interruption occur, the country would be able to expand synthetic fuels pro-
duction in an orderly, economic, and environmentally sound manner. If the
energy-exporting countries see the capabilities of the few commercial plants
in the United States and realize that we can replicate these plants in three
or four years, providing all the fuels we will need for two or three hundred
years, then the exporting countries are likely to think hard about arbitrary
price increases or supply interruptions. Synthetic fuels will give this country
real leverage that is better than a rapid deployment force.
The corporation proceeded deliberately, set up a process, and began
evaluating proposed synfuel projects. To date, we have evaluated more than
160 projects, and turned down about 150, under very strict criteria. First,
projects had to have designs that would allow an estimate of costs to within
5 to 10 percent accuracy. In a billion-dollar plant, that may mean the private
sector sponsor must spend a hundred to two hundred million dollars in design
work, initially, to prove that they were serious about design and manage-
ment. We want to see the sponsor equity in place and an indication that,
in case of cost overruns, extra sponsor equity will also be available. We made
the process tough, and that is why a lot of projects failed.
Of course, when we turned down 150 projects, a few people were upset.
Every project has at least two senators, one congressman, and a governor
unhappy because the project in their state wasn't approved. Under the cir-
cumstances, the corporation was pretty unpopular. We were really taking the
time necessary to enable the private sector, who wanted these projects, to
come up with the design, management, and equity before the corporation
committed taxpayer dollars.
Today we have two plants under SFC contract. One is in operation. The
Cool Water Project in Daggett, California, is an integrated gasification com-
bined cycle facility, which gasifies coal to produce electricity. The plant is
actually burning coal more efficiently and more cleanly than is possible with
the most advanced scrubbers. Cool Water's emissions are only one-tenth of
the Environmental Protection Agency's allowances for coal-fired plants. The
project did not exceed budget and was built on time and offers utilities the
ability to power-in small increments of 100 to 200 megawatts. This is signifi-
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cant because a few years ago many utility companies overestimated their needs
and built big plants which now run far below their design capacity. The resul-
tant inefficiency makes the ability to add power generation in small increments
very attractive to utilities. Over a dozen utilities are now seriously interested
in replicating the Cool Water technology with their own money-not Uncle
Sam's.
The second plant assisted by the corporation is the Dow Syngas Project
in Louisiana. It processes low-rank coals, whereas Cool Water processes high-
ranking bituminous coal. I point this out because coal has so many different
properties and characteristics that different types of gasifiers are needed to
process different coals. Therefore, we need several coal projects in the coun-
try, whereas we would need fewer plants to process the more homogeneous
oil shale.
The Dow Syngas plant is currently under construction, on schedule, and
considerably below budget, with operation planned for 1987. The project will
gasify coal to produce fuel gas for industrial use. The technology has tremen-
dous potential for replication in the industry-intensive Gulf Coast area. Dow
is already planning to expand its own use of the technology, which we believe
will handle coal as efficiently and environmentally safe as does the Cool Water
plant.
So far, the corporation's insistence that projects have their design well
developed before construction has paid off. Design is critical to cost, whether
building a synthetic fuels plant or a single-family home. The corporation has
operated on this principle. Frankly, I think if the Department of Defense would
require similar levels of design before awarding contracts, we would not be
faced with the kind of massive overrun problems we see in programs like
the Ml tank or the B1 bomber.
What is left in front of us? We have three plants that are ready to be signed
in the next few weeks. Two are oil shale plants, using different technologies.
The third project is a relatively small heavy-oil plant. All of these projects
have spent a lot of their own money to develop design and to put their manage-
ment and equity in place.
Some have charged that the corporation is trying to push money out the
door. Two years ago, many Washington sages were saying we were moving
too slowly and accusing us of mismanagement. We were not mismanaging
then and we are not trying to push money out the door now. We have told
the private sector to spend its money up front and these projects have done
so. If we do not sign them now, the corporation would be breaking the com-
mitment set out in the Energy Security Act to assist the private sector to develop
domestic synthetic fuels in the national interest. If the government breaks
faith with the private sector now, if we have another crisis, the private sector
will never get back into a program on anything but a cost-plus basis, just
like the DOD programs.
The limited synthetic fuels program that is nearly complete through the
contract stage will address all of the key domestic resources at a fraction of
the cost originally estimated for a satisfactory program.
In conclusion, I will repeat what I said earlier. As enacted in 1980, syn-
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thetic fuels was to be an $88 billion program. As structured today, the pro-
gram is limited to about six plants, which will provide the benefits the coun-
try really needs. We will learn how to build commercial facilities to use all
of our domestic resources. We will prove technology and reduce costs and
lead times (from eight to ten years to three to four years) for synthetic fuel
plants so that, when we need them, we can build plants efficiently and do
the country some good. We will, in effect, have given the country a perma-
nent insurance policy against ever again being held hostage by foreign energy
producers.
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